*/
Workers’ Compensation Board
OPINION ENTERED: November 9, 2018
CLAIM
NO. 199332090
LARRY SCHNEIDER PETITIONER
VS. APPEAL FROM HON. JOHN H. MCCRACKEN,
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE
PROGRESS PAINT MANUFACTURING
SPECIAL FUND
and HON. JOHN H.
MCCRACKEN,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE RESPONDENTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*
* * * * *
BEFORE: ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and
RECHTER, Members.
STIVERS, Member. Larry Schneider (“Schneider”) appeals from the June 29,
2018, Order of Hon. John H. McCracken, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
sustaining the motions of the Special Fund and Progress Paint Manufacturing
(“Progress”) to dismiss his motion to reopen seeking additional income
benefits.
On
appeal, Schneider challenges that portion of the ALJ’s Order sustaining the
Special Fund’s motion to dismiss his motion to reopen as not being timely
filed. Relying upon Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 775
(Ky. 2008), Schneider asserts his motion was timely filed.
BACKGROUND
The
record reflects Schneider filed a Form 101 on October 30, 1996, alleging a June
4, 1993, injury to his right shoulder and neck. On April 10, 1997, Hon. Mark
Webster, Administrative Law Judge approved the settlement agreement entered
into between Schneider, Progress, and the Special Fund. The Form 110 Agreement
as to Compensation lists the nature of the injury as “shoulder and disputed
neck” and provides the following regarding the compensation Schneider received:
TTD
as paid thru 4/23/95 followed by a 20% occupational disability split 75% DE
& 2550 SF. To be paid weekly from 4/23/95 at $52 a week and interest on
past due, for 425 weeks. Employer paying their liability first for
proportionate share followed by SF. DE will pay for epidurals and Plaintiff will
give 60 day notice of any proposed neck surgery.
Reasonable Medicals per 342.
On
June 7, 2000, Schneider filed a motion to reopen asserting a worsening of
condition. In an order dated July 11, 2000, Hon. Sheila Lowther, Chief
Administrative Law Judge (“CALJ Lowther”), concluded Schneider had made a prima facie showing for reopening and
ordered the claim transferred to an Administrative Law Judge for further
adjudication. Following the introduction of the proof, Hon. Ronald E. Johnson,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ Johnson”), entered a March 26, 2001, Opinion and
Order finding Schneider had not demonstrated an increase in occupational
disability. However, he found the neck injury, which was disputed in the
original claim, was caused by the June 1993 work injury since Schneider had a
“pre-existing dormant non-disabling condition that was brought into active
reality as a result of the work related injury.” ALJ
Johnson found the neck injury “is apportioned 50/50 between the
defendant-employer and the Special Fund.” There was no finding of apportionment
for the shoulder injury, and ALJ Johnson ordered the motion to reopen dismissed
with the finding that the neck injury was caused by the work-related injury and
apportioned 50/50 between Progress and the Special Fund. Schneider filed a
petition for reconsideration alleging several errors which resulted in ALJ
Johnson entering a May 14, 2001, Order sustaining the petition for
reconsideration. ALJ Johnson found Schneider had a 20% impairment at the time
of the original settlement, one-fourth of which was attributable to the
shoulder injury, with the balance due to the work-related neck injury. ALJ
Johnson also found Schneider had a 30% occupational disability as a result of
the work-related injury at the time of reopening. Consequently, he directed
“the increase of 10% is apportioned 50/50 between [Progress] and the Special
Fund.” The Opinion and Award was amended to reflect Progress shall pay for
medical expenses relating to the neck and shoulder injuries pursuant to the
statute. In addition to the amount set forth in the original agreement,
Schneider was to recover from Progress and the Special Fund $26.00 per week due
to the additional 10% permanent occupational disability. Payments were to
commence on the date of reopening, June 7, 2000, and paid by Progress for the
number of weeks proportionate to its 50% liability, after which the Special
Fund was to pay all income benefits directly to Schneider for the remainder of
the compensable period. No appeal was taken from the May 14, 2001, Order.
On
July 21, 2004, Schneider filed another motion to reopen asserting he was more
disabled than he was at the time of settlement and had undergone surgery. On
August 30, 2004, CALJ Lowther, entered an Order concluding Schneider had made a prima facie
showing for reopening and directing the claim to be assigned to an
Administrative Law Judge for further adjudication. Both the Special Fund and
Progress were served with an Order sustaining the motion to reopen.[1]
Progress
appealed from the orders sustaining the motions to reopen to the Board. In a
January 14, 2005, Opinion, this Board ordered the appeal dismissed as an appeal
from an interlocutory order and remanded the claim to an Administrative Law
Judge.
The
claim was assigned to Hon. Lawrence F. Smith, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ
Smith”) who, in a December 16, 2005, Opinion, Order, and Award, found Schneider
was entitled to temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits of $260.00 per week
to be paid from July 21, 2004, to July 26, 2004.
Schneider
filed a Notice of Appeal on January 17, 2006, and on February 16, 2006, he
filed a brief. On February 27, 2006, Schneider filed another motion to reopen
with various attachments alleging, “there has been a change of condition that
relates to the modifiers in KRS 342.7301(c).”
On
March 31, 2006, Schneider filed a motion to hold the appeal in abeyance pending
an appellate decision in Bartee v. University Medical Center,
2006-CA-000401, concerning the issue of when he is first entitled to TTD
benefits. Schneider contended he was entitled to TTD benefits prior to the time
he filed his motion to reopen. On April 19, 2006, this Board entered an Order
holding the appeal in abeyance pending a final appellate decision on this
issue.
On
December 9, 2006, Schneider filed a Motion to Remand for Approval of Settlement
indicating the parties had reached an agreement with respect to the issues
presented. On January 3, 2008, this Board
entered an Order removing the claim from abeyance and remanding the claim to
the Administrative Law Judge for consideration of the proposed settlement
agreement.
On
January 11, 2008, the proposed settlement agreement was approved by an
Administrative Law Judge.[2] The
agreement pertained to two different claims, but relevant to the subject claim
the agreement states Schneider did not waive his entitlement to past or future
medical benefits. However, he waived his right to vocational rehabilitation and
right to reopen. The relevant language reads as follows:
This is a compromise settlement of
these disputed claims. The Plaintiff has filed Motions to Reopen in both
claims, alleging entitlement to additional temporary total disability benefits
and/or additional permanent partial disability benefits. The Defendant
specifically denies that the Plaintiff has proven entitlement to any additional
income benefits of any sort. As a compromise, the Defendant agrees to pay, and
the Plaintiff agrees to accept, a lump sum of $16,500.00 on the terms and
conditions set out below.
The parties agree that this lump sum
settlement of $16,500.00 includes payments of $12,000.00 for any additional
income benefits for either claims, including additional temporary total
disability benefits, additional permanent partial disability benefits, or
permanent total disability benefits, including interest, an additional
$1,500.00 for waiver of the Plaintiff’s right to vocational rehabilitation
benefits, and an additional $3,000.00 for waiver of the Plaintiff’s right to
reopen these claims for any additional income benefits or vocational
rehabilitation benefits in the future. The Plaintiff further agrees to dismiss
his pending Motions to Reopen, in both claims and his pending appeal to the
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board in Claim No. 93-32090.
On
January 22, 2008, Progress filed a motion to dismiss the appeal stating the
matter had been settled and a settlement agreement had been approved. In a June 17, 2010, Order this Board sustained
the motion and dismissed the appeal.
On
November 2, 2015, Schneider filed a motion to reopen with several attached
documents alleging he required epidural steroid injections or in the alternative
that he be allowed to proceed with “a posterior approach for a discectomy and
fusion from C4-7” which had been denied by utilization review. Schneider did
not serve this motion upon the Special Fund.
On
December 3, 2015, Progress filed a response to the motion to reopen.
Significantly, Progress did not raise the terms of the January 11, 2008,
settlement agreement as a bar to the motion to reopen.
On January 19, 2016, Schneider filed a medical
fee dispute indicating the subject of the dispute was treatment denied by
utilization review. On February 1, 2016,
Hon. Jane Rice Williams, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ Williams”) entered an
Order finding Schneider had made a prima
facie showing for reopening, sustaining the motion to reopen, and joining
the medical provider, Dr. George Raque. On February 15, 2016, ALJ Williams
entered a “Scheduling Order Following Initial Conference On
Medical Dispute Reopening” which reflects “cervical surgery” was the challenged
or unpaid procedure at issue and the basis of the challenge was the
reasonableness/necessity. ALJ Williams
set a proof schedule and a Benefit Review Conference.
On
February 22, 2016, Progress filed a motion to dismiss the pending medical fee
dispute as moot representing that after the BRC a determination was made that
the surgery which had been suggested would be authorized. Progress also
represented it would pay TTD benefits from the date of surgery until the date
Schneider attained maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) or released to return to
a job for which he was qualified. Progress asserted this agreement rendered
Schneider’s motion to reopen and medical fee dispute moot and requested
dismissal. On March 8, 2016, ALJ Williams
entered an Order sustaining Progress’ motion and dismissed the medical fee
dispute.
On
June 8, 2017, Schneider filed the subject motion to reopen asserting his
treating physician believes he is in need of “right reverse total shoulder
surgery” which was scheduled and had been approved by the carrier. However,
Schneider was requesting “TTD at least for the period from the date of the
surgery until he reaches maximum medical improvement and/or additional
permanent partial impairment or permanent total disability/occupational
disability.”
On
August 1, 2017, Hon. Douglas W. Gott, Chief Administrative Law Judge (“CALJ
Gott”), entered an Order finding Schneider had made a prima facie showing for reopening and sustaining the motion.
However, because Progress was voluntarily paying TTD benefits due to the
surgery performed by Dr. Kris Abeln, CALJ Gott
temporarily assigned the claim to himself and placed it in abeyance.
No
action was taken until CALJ Gott entered a March 9, 2018, Order directing the
parties to file status reports within twenty days and include recommendations
for scheduling further proceedings.
On
April 10, 2018, Schneider filed the medical record of Dr. Raque and a separate
status report requesting CALJ Gott schedule a telephonic status conference for
the purpose of determining a proof schedule. Schneider represented the issue of
TTD benefits was resolved, but his motion to reopen requested additional
permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits or permanent total disability
(“PTD”) benefits. Progress also filed a status report.
In
an Order dated May 7, 2018, CALJ Gott noted TTD benefits were terminated when
Schneider reached MMI following surgery. Further, the parties agreed to a proof
schedule as to remaining issues. Upon oral motion from the parties, the Special
Fund was joined as a party to this reopening. The claim was transferred and
reassigned to the ALJ.
On
May 14, 2018, Progress filed a motion to dismiss asserting that when Schneider
filed the current motion its counsel was unaware of the terms of the January
11, 2008, settlement agreement which reflects Schneider had waived his right to
reopen this claim for additional income benefits of any type. Progress argued Schneider
has waived his right to reopen the claim against it and the motion to reopen
against it should be dismissed. Progress took no position regarding the motion
to reopen pertaining to the Special Fund.
Thereafter,
the Special Fund entered an appearance and filed a motion to dismiss. The Special
Fund indicated a review of the record as set forth in its motion to dismiss
reflects it had not been ordered to pay any benefits to Schneider since ALJ
Johnson’s May 14, 2001, decision. It asserted that, even then the additional
benefits ordered were only ordered to be paid during the compensable period
which ended on June 3, 2003. It noted ALJ Smith awarded TTD benefits when the
case was reopened in 2004. Further, when the claim was reopened in 2006 and
2015, no additional PPD benefits were sought from the Special Fund nor were
benefits from the Special Fund awarded. Relying upon KRS 342.125(4), the
Special Fund argued Schneider was now prohibited from filing a motion to reopen
and the motion to reopen seeking additional income benefits against it should
also be dismissed.
On
June 29, 2018, the ALJ entered the following order dismissing both parties:
Defendants,
Special Fund, and Defendant Progress Paint MFD., filed motions to dismiss
Plaintiff's motion to reopen. The Special Fund states that Plaintiff's claims
were resolved by settlement agreement dated April 10, 1997. The Special Fund
was responsible for 25% of the settlement income benefits commencing on April
23, 1995 for a period of 425 weeks. The Special Fund asserts that the
"compensable period" ended June 3, 2003. On July 23, 2004, Plaintiff
filed a motion to reopen alleging a greater disability. ALJ Smith awarded
Plaintiff TTD from July 21, 2004 to July 26, 2004. No benefits were awarded
against the Special Fund. This decision was appealed to the Workers'
Compensation Board. The appeal to the Board was dismissed June 22, 2010. On
March 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed another Motion to Re-open for a knee injury and
sought to increase the multiplier. On January 15, 2008, the ALJ approved an
agreement resolving the 2006 motion to reopen from claim number 1998-01374 and
1993-32090. This agreement reflects that $3,000.00 was paid to Plaintiff to
waive her right to reopen her claims for any additional income benefits. The
agreement also reflects that $12,000.00 was paid to Plaintiff for any
additional temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability
benefits, or permanent total disability benefits for both of
these claims. This agreement was filed by Defendant Progress Paint MFD
in their motion to dismiss.
No other
action was taken by Plaintiff on her claim from June 22, 2010 until she filed
her motion to reopen on November 2, 2015. This represents more than a four year gap between any order in the case and her motion
to reopen. This motion was resolved by order dismissing the motion to reopen
entered March 8, 2016. The current motion to reopen was filed on June 8, 2017.
Initially, only the employer was named in this motion to reopen. The Special
Fund was joined as a party by order entered May 7, 2018. The Special Fund moves
to be dismissed as a party to this claim.
Defendant/Employer
has moved to dismiss the motion to reopen due to the January 15, 2008
settlement agreement. They allege Plaintiff waived all of his rights to
additional TTD, PTD, and PPD.
Plaintiff's
motion to reopen is limited to a request for TTD, PTD and PPD.
Plaintiff's
initial award period was for 425 weeks from April 23, 1995, the date TTD ended
from the initial 1993 injury. That period of compensibility
[sic] for this injury ended on June 3, 2003. All of Plaintiff's motions to
reopen filed through March 2, 2006, were filed within four years of either the
original award, or order granting or denying benefits. KRS 342.125(3). The 2006
motion to reopen was dismissed by the Workers' Compensation Board on June 22,
2010. The next motion to reopen was filed November 2, 2015, more than fours
[sic] after the dismissal of the 2006 motion to reopen. Additionally, the
Special Fund has not been ordered to pay any benefits to the decision of ALJ
Johnson dated May 14, 2001. KRS 342.125(3) prohibits a Plaintiff from filing a
motion more than four years following the date of the original award or order
granting or denying benefits. In this case, there is a gap of longer than four
years following the dismissal of the 2006 motion to reopen. For this reason
alone, the motion to reopen for TTD, PTD and PPD must be dismissed.
With
regards to the Special Fund, the period of compensability for which the Special
Fund could be liable ended on June 3, 2003. The ALJ finds that the Special Fund
could not be liable for income benefits on this claim beyond that date. Of
interest, is the absence of the Special Fund as a party to the 2008 Form 110 settment [sic] agreement. If any of the parties thought
that the Special Fund had additional liability, it appears as though the
Special Fund would have been included in the 2008 settlement.
In the
2008 Form 110, Plaintiff waived any additional TTD, PTD or PPD income benefits
arising out of this claim. Plaintiff additionally waived her right to reopen to
claim any additional TTD, PTD or PPD benefits in this settlement agreement. The
Defendant/Employer was a party to this agreement. The ALJ finds that Plaintiff
waived her right to seek additional TTD, PTD or PPD benefits.
For the
reasons stated above, the ALJ sustains both the Special Fund and
Defendant/Employer's motions to dismiss Plaintiff's motion to reopen [sic].
Plaintiff's motion to reopen for TTD, PTD and PPD income benefits is overruled
and dismissed.
On
appeal, Schneider notes the ALJ found the Special Fund’s liability ended on
June 3, 2003, and it could not be liable for any income benefits in this claim
beyond that date. Schneider contends that finding by the ALJ is incorrect as
the Special Fund could be liable for its portion of any PTD benefits awarded.
Schneider asserts the ALJ incorrectly noted the Special Fund was not a party to
the Form 110 settlement agreement approved in 2008, and if the Special Fund had
additional liability, it would have been included in the 2008 settlement.
Schneider argues the Special Fund was not a party to the motion to reopen
because Schneider had only sought TTD benefits and medical benefits. Schneider
agreed the waiver set forth in the settlement agreement of 2008 extinguished
his rights to additional income benefits against Progress, but did not bar his
claim against the Special Fund for PTD benefits. Relying upon Hall v.
Hospitality Resources, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008), Schneider argues
his motion to reopen was clearly filed within the four year statute of
limitations contained in KRS 342.125(3) “as the Motion to Reopen was filed
within four years from the November 2, 2015 Motion to Reopen which resulted in additional
income benefits.” Schneider requests
that portion of the ALJ’s decision dismissing the Special Fund be vacated and
the claim remanded to the ALJ for additional proceedings and a decision on the
issue of whether he is permanently totally disabled as a result of the work injury.
Schneider
filed a reply brief responding to the Special Fund’s assertion that the newly
enacted version of KRS 342.125(3) effective July 14, 2018, controls as it
directs that all claims respective of when they occurred or when the award was
entered or the settlement approved are subject to the four year time limit
contained therein. Schneider contends the language regarding retroactivity was
not included in the final version of the statute and therefore the amended
statute does not apply retroactively to limit the claimant’s right to reopen.
Schneider also filed a notice of constitutional challenge served upon the
Kentucky Attorney General in which he asserts a challenge to the
constitutionality of KRS 342.125(8) as amended on July 14, 2018.
We
decline to address the applicability of the newly enacted version of KRS
342.125(3) in light of the recent Court of Appeals holding in Holcim v.
Swinford, 2018-CA-000414-WC, rendered September 7, 2018, To Be Published,
which is not final. Further, this Board has no authority to address a
constitutional challenge to a statute. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Cornett,
300 Ky. 647, 189 S.W.2d 963 (1945). Thus, for reasons other than those espoused
by the ALJ, we affirm.
KRS
342.125(3) reads in relevant part as follows:
Except for reopening solely for
determination of the compensability of medical expenses, fraud, or conforming
the award as set forth in KRS
342.730(1)(c)2., or for reducing a permanent total disability award
when an employee returns to work, or seeking temporary total disability
benefits during the period of an award, no claim shall be reopened more than
four (4) years following the date of the original award or original order
granting or denying benefits, when such an award or order becomes final and nonappealable, and no party may file a motion to reopen
within one (1) year of any previous motion to reopen by the same party. Orders
granting or denying benefits that are entered subsequent to an original final
award or order granting or denying benefits shall not be
considered to be an original order granting or denying benefits under
this subsection and shall not extend the time to reopen a claim beyond four (4)
years following the date of the final, nonappealable
original award or original order.
In
Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., supra, the Kentucky Supreme
Court interpreted the language “no claim shall be reopened more than four (4)
years following the date of the original award or granting or denying benefits”
to mean:
That the reference to the
“original award or order granting or denying benefits” was intended to
encompass orders granting benefits other than the “original award,”
is established by several additional uses in the same statute. For example, KRS
342.125(1) allows an ALJ to “reopen and review any award or order”
on stated grounds. (emphasis added). It is uncontestable that the reference to
“order” in KRS
342.125(1) encompasses an order different than the original award,
otherwise there could be no reopenings of awards
changed subsequent to the original award, increasing or decreasing benefits, as
all must concede is the practice. For example, KRS
342.125(l) (d) specifically allows a “reopening and review”
upon a “[c]hange of disability as shown by objective
medical evidence of worsening or improvement of impairment due to a condition
caused by the injury since the date of the award or order.” (emphasis
added). If the word “order” was interpreted to refer only to the original
award, a “review and reopening” of a subsequently increased or decreased award
or order could simply not occur. And, KRS
342.125(4) acknowledges that the “[r]eopening
shall not affect the previous order or award as to any sums already paid
thereunder.” (emphasis added). Meaning simply that the new award or
order will operate prospective only for the remaining term of the award.
Given our further analysis, the
conclusion that an “order granting or denying benefits” was tended to encompass
an order granting benefits different than an original award or
settlement is compelling. Thus, the reference in KRS
342.125(3) to the “the original award or order granting or denying
benefits,” must necessarily refer not only to the original award, but to any subsequent
order granting or denying benefits. Any contrary interpretation leads to absurd
results, as well as a violation of the clear spirit of the Kentucky Workers'
Compensation Act. Plummer
v. Sharondale Coal Corp., 834 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Ky. App. 1992) (“We
refuse to afford an interpretation to the statute that would create irrational
distinctions yielding absurd results that would serve to undermine the purpose
of the Workers' Compensation Act.”). “We have often said that statutes will not
be given [such a] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or
unreasonable conclusion.” Wesley
v. Board of Ed. of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28, 30
(Ky. 1966); see also Commonwealth
of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, 320 S.W.2d 125,
126 (Ky. 1959).
The Appellant's motion, therefore,
was clearly filed within the four year period of the statute of limitations
contained in KRS
342.125(3), as the motion to reopen filed on November 7, 2003, was
within four years from the February 14, 2001, order granting benefits. [footnote omitted]. An
order denying a motion to reopen under the prima facie principles of Hodges
and Stambaugh, on the other hand, would not constitute an order
granting or denying benefits, as a denial of a motion to reopen for failure
to make a prima facie showing does not deal with benefits, but rather
whether or not there are grounds to reopen and take proof akin to a motion to
re-docket. Cf., Hodges, 182 S.W.3d at 500; see also Stambaugh, 488 S.W.2d at 681.
Id. at
784-785.
Pursuant to Hall v. Hospitality Resources,
Inc., supra, Schneider must have filed his motion to reopen within
four years of a subsequent order granting or denying benefits. The January 11,
2008, Order is the last such order granting or denying benefits. We will not
address the fact the agreement did not grant additional benefits against the
Special Fund, as the analysis does not require us to address that issue. For
our purposes, the key document in resolving the issue before us is the
settlement agreement approved by the ALJ on January 11, 2008, granting
Schneider additional income benefits. Even though Schneider filed a motion to
reopen on November 2, 2015, the medical fee dispute was ultimately dismissed
because Progress voluntarily paid for Schneider’s surgery, and agreed to pay an
additional amount of TTD benefits from the date of the surgery until the date
he reached MMI or was released to return to a job. ALJ Williams’ March 8, 2016,
Order did not deny or grant additional benefits. The November 2, 2015, motion
to reopen and the subsequent dismissal of the motion to reopen have no bearing
on the limitation period. Consequently, the January 8, 2017, motion to reopen
was not timely filed, and the ALJ did not err in dismissing the motion to
reopen. Schneider’s motion to reopen must have been filed within four years of
the January 11, 2008, Order.
In Hall v. Hospitality Resources,
Inc., supra, the Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue
citing to its decision in Kendrick v. Toyota, 145 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Ky.
App. 2004) stating:
Kendrick, however, dealt only with the
question of whether the voluntary payment of post-award TTD benefits by
the employer without a motion and order granting such benefits, extended
the four year statute of limitations under KRS
342.125(3). The Court, holding the filing of the motion to reopen
untimely, held the “[v]oluntary payment of TTD
benefits post-award is not an exception contained within the statute.” Id.
A point with which we do not disagree, since there was no order requiring
payment of income benefits.
Id. at
783.
As held in Kendrick v. Toyota,
supra, since ALJ Williams’ order dismissed the medical dispute without
requiring the payment of income benefits, the four-year period set forth in KRS
342.125(2) was not extended by virtue of the March 8, 2016, Order. Because the
motion to reopen filed June 8, 2017, was filed more than four years after the
January 11, 2008, Order approving the settlement agreement, Schneider’s motion
was not timely filed. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in sustaining the Special
Fund’s motion to dismiss Schneider’s motion to reopen seeking additional income
benefits from the Special Fund.
Accordingly, the June 29, 2018, Order sustaining Special
Fund’s motion to dismiss Schneider’s motion to reopen against Special Fund is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
DISTRIBUTION: METHOD
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:
HON WAYNE C DAUB LMS
600 W MAIN ST STE 300
LOUISVILLE KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/SPECIAL FUND:
HON THOMAS A DOCKTER LMS
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS’ CLAIMS LEGAL DIVISION
657 CHAMBERLIN AVE
FRANKFORT KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
HON JAMES FOGLE LMS
610 S FOURTH ST STE 701
LOUISVILLE KY 40202
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:
HON JOHN H MCCRACKEN LMS
657 CHAMBERLIN AVE
FRANKFORT KY 40601
