Workers’
Compensation Board
OPINION
ENTERED: April 14, 2017
CLAIM NO. 200364300
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, LAP PETITIONER
VS. APPEAL FROM HON. JONATHAN WEATHERBY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
JOHN J. FUERTES
and HON. JONATHAN WEATHERBY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RESPONDENTS
OPINION
VACATING
*
* * * * *
BEFORE: ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and RECHTER, Members.
STIVERS,
Member.
Ford Motor Company, LAP (“Ford”) appeals from the December 22, 2016, Order of
Hon. Jonathan Weatherby, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) amending his August
8, 2016, Order to state John J. Fuertes (“Fuertes”) is entitled to interest at
the rate of 12% per annum from the date his permanent partial disability
(“PPD”) benefits were enhanced by the two multiplier pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)2.
The ALJ’s August 8, 2016, Order reads
as follows:[1]
This matter has been remanded to the ALJ
for a determination of the applicability of the "2" multiplier per
KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, in light of the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling in Livingood
v. Transfreight, LLC , 467 SW3d 249 (Ky. 2015). The following findings are
hereby entered:
In Livingood, the Kentucky Supreme
Court established a standard that requires the employer to prove that the
Plaintiff's conduct constitutes an intentional deliberate action with a
reckless disregard of the consequences to either himself or another in order to
avoid the "2" multiplier for an applicable cessation of employment.
The Defendant Employer in this matter was given the opportuntiy to produce
evidence that would support a claim that this Plaintiff was terminated for
reasons that would satisfy this standard. The evidence put forward establishes
that the reason for termination given by the employer was a failure of the
Plaintiff to perform at an acceptable level. This alone does not approach the
standard established in Livingood. The ALJ finds that the Plaintiff was
terminated for reasons that do not satisfy the standard in Livingood and
that also do not disqualify him for the "2" multiplier per KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.
ORDER
The Plaintiff's permanent partial
disability benefits shall be enhanced by a factor of "2" per KRS
342.730(1)(c)2, beginning on the date of his termination, March 11, 2005.
Fuertes
alleged he sustained multiple injuries on October 30, 2003. In an October 21, 2010, Opinion and Award,
Hon. James L. Kerr, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ Kerr”) determined Fuertes
sustained a right knee injury meriting a 5% impairment rating, a cervical spine
injury resulting in a 3% impairment rating, and a right shoulder injury
resulting in a 4% impairment rating. ALJ
Kerr dismissed Fuertes’ claim for a lumbar injury. ALJ Kerr awarded temporary total disability
(“TTD”) benefits for various periods in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Beginning February 5, 2005, Fuertes was
awarded PPD benefits based on a 12% impairment rating for 425 weeks together
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on all past due and unpaid
installments of compensation. ALJ Kerr “declined to award any multipliers in
Fuertes’ claim.” He also resolved
various medical fee disputes asserted by Ford.
Because Fuertes had filed a hearing loss claim and ALJ Kerr failed to
ensure Fuertes had undergone a University Evaluation (“UE”) as required by KRS
342.315, the claim was placed in abeyance until the UE was performed. Upon submission of all the proof in the hearing
loss claim, on June 24, 2011, ALJ Kerr rendered an Opinion and Award
determining Fuertes had a 2% impairment due to work-related noise exposure and
was only entitled to an award of medical benefits. ALJ Kerr also ruled on
outstanding petitions for reconsideration that had been filed following the
October 21, 2010, Opinion and Award. ALJ
Kerr amended the October 21, 2010, Opinion and Award to correct factual errors
and reaffirmed his finding Fuertes retained the capacity to return to the type
of work performed at the time of the injury until his termination by Ford. Thus, the three multiplier was not
applicable. ALJ Kerr amended the award
of TTD benefits and also set aside an award of TTD benefits from September 7,
2004, through September 28, 2004. ALJ Kerr awarded benefits for the
work-related hearing loss. The remainder of the October 21, 2010, Opinion and
Award remained unaltered. Fuertes appealed from the October 2010 and June 2011 decisions
requesting the Board remand the claim to the ALJ for a finding he sustained a
compensable lumbar injury; did not retain the physical capacity to return to
work or, alternatively, that he is entitled to benefits enhanced by the two
multiplier; he is entitled to an award of income benefits for the hearing loss;
and is entitled to TTD benefits as originally awarded by the ALJ.
In an Opinion rendered October 27, 2011,
this Board affirmed ALJ Kerr’s determination Fuertes did not sustain a
compensable low back injury, is not entitled to enhanced benefits by the three
multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1, and is entitled to medical benefits
but not income benefits as a result of his work-related hearing loss. However, we reversed that portion of the June
24, 2011, Opinion and Award setting aside the award of TTD benefits from
September 7, 2004, through September 28, 2004, in the October 21, 2010, Opinion
and Award. The claim was remanded to the
ALJ for entry of an amended opinion and award, reinstating the award of TTD
benefits. Because we believed the ALJ
did not resolve entitlement to enhanced PPD benefits by the two multiplier, the
claim was also remanded for a determination of whether Fuertes was entitled to
enhanced PPD benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 and the applicable case
law. Ford appealed the Board’s decision
remanding the claim for a determination of whether the two multiplier was
applicable.
On October 4, 2013, the Court of Appeals
rendered an Opinion Reversing and Remanding concluding the Board erred in
remanding the matter to the ALJ for additional findings and stating as follows:
Taken
as a whole, we find that the phraseology of the ALJ’s two orders clearly
conveys the ALJ’s belief that Fuertes failed to produce substantial evidence
supporting that his termination was related to any work-related disability (i.e.,
the third of the above factors). And, because “effect must be given to that
which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as that
which is expressed in the most appropriate language,” Furlow v. Sturgeon,
436 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Ky. 1969) (citation omitted), the ALJ’s refusal to apply
“any multiplier” to Fuertes’s benefits effectively carried with it a refusal to
apply the multiplier specified in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. For this reason, we agree
that the Board erred in remanding this matter to the ALJ for additional
findings; the findings contemplated by the Board were already made.
Having
resolved the only issue briefed by Ford in its appeal, there is now a question
of how to proceed. Ford argues that because the Board erred in directing the
ALJ to make additional findings, Fuertes’s claim for benefits multiplied by KRS
342.730(1)(c)2 should simply be dismissed. We disagree.
In Hutchins v. General Elec. Co.,
190 S.W.3d 333 (Ky. 2006), the Kentucky Supreme Court remanded to the Court of
Appeals for a review of appellate issues on the merits after determining that
the Court of Appeals had incorrectly dismissed a claimant’s petition for review
for failing to name an indispensable party. In Aisin Automotive Castings v.
Rose, No. 2007-CA-000825- WC, 2007 WL 3317545 (Ky. App. Nov. 9, 2007),
[footnote omitted] the Court of Appeals remanded to the Workers’ Compensation
Board for review of whether the ALJ’s opinion regarding a claimant’s
entitlement to medical expenses was supported by substantial evidence after the
Board erroneously determined that the failure to join the claimant’s attorney
as a party to the administrative appeal precluded any review of that issue. As
a practical matter, an erroneous refusal to address an issue on appeal due to a
perceived failure to join an indispensable party is the same as an erroneous
refusal to address an issue on appeal for any other perceived lack of authority.
Thus, taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that in the context
of workers’ compensation where a lower appellate tribunal disposes of all or
part of an appeal as the result of a mistaken belief that it has no authority
to conduct any review, the proper disposition of the case may include remanding
the case back to the lower appellate tribunal for consideration of the
undecided issues on the merits.
We believe that this is the proper way to
proceed. In the instant matter, when these proceedings were before the Board,
in addition to arguing that the ALJ had failed to make any findings regarding
KRS 342.730(1)(c)2, Fuertes also argued that the evidence of record compelled a
finding that KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 applied to his award. The Board did not address
Fuertes’s latter argument because, in perceiving that the ALJ had failed to
make any finding regarding KRS 342.730(1)(c)2—and in correctly understanding
that only the ALJ has the authority to make any such finding [footnote
omitted]- the Board assumed that it had no authority to address whether the
evidence of record would have compelled such a finding.
CONCLUSION
The Board incorrectly remanded this matter
to the ALJ for additional findings. To that extent, we reverse. However,
because the Board failed to address whether the ALJ erred in his determination
that substantial evidence does not support the application of the multiplier
described in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 to Fuertes’s award, we remand with directions
for the Board to review this issue on the merits.
Slip Op. at 4-5.
On
January 14, 2014, we entered an opinion affirming in part and remanding in
part. We determined the record compelled
a finding KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 is applicable as Fuertes returned to work at the
same wage earned at the time of the injury.
However, we concluded the evidence did not compel a finding Fuertes was
entitled to PPD benefits enhanced by the two multiplier at the time of the
ALJ’s decision. We directed as follows:
Fuertes
is not presently entitled to receive permanent partial disability (“PPD”)
benefits enhanced by the two multiplier. Nonetheless, pursuant to the Court’s
holding in Chrysalis House v. Tackett, 283 S.W.3d 671 (Ky. 2009), KRS
342.730(1)(c)2 is applicable to his claim because he did return to work at the
same wage as he earned at the time of his injury, albeit for a limited period.
His right to enhancement by the two multiplier is not triggered until such time
as he again returns to work at the same wage and then subsequently ceases to
earn that wage for a reason connected to his work injury.
Slip Op. at 4.
The ALJ was directed to enter an
amended opinion and award reinstating the original award of TTD benefits. The ALJ was also directed to amend his
decision to reflect KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 is applicable and Fuertes may reopen his
claim should he return to work at the same or greater wage and subsequently
cease to earn that wage for a reason related to his injury.
After rendition of the Board’s opinion, Fuertes timely appealed. While the matter was pending before the Court
of Appeals, without filing a motion to reopen as required by 803 KAR 25:012
Section 1(6), Ford filed multiple medical fee disputes.[2] In an opinion rendered May 1, 2015, the Court
of Appeals affirmed our decision.
Fuertes appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In
Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co., 481 S.W.3d 808 (Ky. 2016), rendered February
18, 2016, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals based on its recent holding
in Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC, 467 S.W.3d 249 (Ky. 2015) and
remanded for further proceedings. The
Supreme Court noted the Board’s review “was limited to determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ’s finding, or if the evidence compels
a different result.” Id. at 810. The Supreme Court concluded it need not
address the merits of Fuertes’ argument due to its recent holding in Livingood,
supra. Therefore, it instructed
as follows:
In this matter, no
finding has been made whether Fuertes's conduct at Ford satisfies this new
standard so as to justify the denial of the application of the two multiplier.
On remand, the ALJ should make a finding of whether Fuertes engaged in conduct
as outlined in Livingood
that led to the reduction of hours he worked and ultimate termination. We note
that this is a high standard and basic bad behavior will not bar application of
the two multiplier. If Fuertes did not engage in such conduct, the two
multiplier may be applied to his award.
Fuertes has
additionally requested that this Court decide whether the claimant or employer
has the burden of proof to show the employee was fired due to the type of
misconduct as described in Livingood.
To prove that the claimant was fired because he committed that type of
misconduct, evidence must be provided which supports the conclusion the
claimant acted inappropriately. Obviously it is unlikely that the claimant
would admit to misconduct. Because of this, and since proving that type of
misconduct occurred is a defense against application of the two multiplier, the
burden of proof is upon the employer to show the claimant's termination was
caused by the type of behavior described in Livingood.
Id.
On March 7, 2016, Ford filed a
“Motion to Reopen Proof” asserting that since the law has now changed, it will be
materially affected on remand if it is not permitted to introduce proof as to
why Fuertes was fired and “whether or not his behavior contributed to his
termination and eventual loss of same or greater wages.” Ford requested proof be reopened to allow it
to submit evidence regarding this issue arguing that failure to reopen the
record would result in significant prejudice.
On that same date, Ford filed a “Motion to
Join Southwest Laboratory” as a party to one of its medical fee disputes and another
medical fee dispute.
On March 14, 2016, Fuertes filed a
response to the Form 112, the Motion to Join Southwest Laboratory, and an
objection to Ford’s motion to reopen the proof time.
Thereafter,
between March 28, 2016, and May 19, 2016, Ford filed a Motion to Supplement
Medical Fee Dispute, a Motion to Join Dr. Scott Kuiper, and another Medical Dispute.
In
June 2016, Fuertes filed a response to the medical fee dispute and motion to
join Dr. Kuiper and the records of Louisville Orthopedic Clinic. That same month, Ford filed its reply to Fuertes’ response.
On July 18, 2016, the ALJ entered an order noting the parties had
participated in a telephonic conference and Ford had requested an opportunity
to enter proof in order to establish the “‘Livingood’ standard with
respect to the applicable multiplier.”
The ALJ directed Ford had until August 5, 2016, to present prima facie evidence of the likelihood
that the standard may be satisfied. A
telephonic conference was set for August 5, 2016.
On August 8, 2016, the ALJ entered
the order enhancing Fuertes’ benefits by the two multiplier beginning on March
11, 2005. The next day, Fuertes filed a
“Response to Defendant’s Submission of Prima Facie Evidence.”[3]
Neither party filed a petition for reconsideration or a notice of
appeal. The first pleading filed in the
record thereafter is the October 28, 2016, “Motion for Approval of Attorney
Fee” filed by Fuertes’ counsel.
On November 9, 2016, Fuertes filed a “Motion to Clarify Ruling”
asserting as follows:
Although not specified, the ALJ's decision, as a matter
of clearly established law, modifies the original award
to reflect that Plaintiff was
entitled to double benefits (2 times $51.43), such that the award would be,
"beginning March 11, 2005, the sum of $102.86 per week and continuing
for a period not to exceed 425 weeks together with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum on all past due and unpaid installments of such
compensation." The Defendant, however, has
refused, without reasonable foundation, to pay
interest, by asserting in an October 26, 2016 email correspondence that,
"There was no award for interest and since there was no petition for
reconsideration requesting that award, Ford did not pay interest." The undersigned does not believe the
limited findings in this case can reasonably be afforded Defendant's
interpretation. Nevertheless, Plaintiff respectfully requests an Order
scheduling a Telephonic Conference
at least ten days after the filing of this Motion (to afford Defendant an
opportunity to Respond) and a subsequent Order correcting any findings rendered
on or about August 10, 2016 which
may be subject to misinterpretation by Defendant as discussed herein. Whittaker v. Hall, 132 S.W.3d 816 (Ky. 2004).
On December
7, 2016, Fuertes filed a “Notice of Filing Order” with a tendered order. Fuertes contended the tendered order
reconciled the ALJ’s findings “rendered on or about August 10, 2016” with ALJ
Kerr’s original October 21, 2010, award.
On December
22, 2016, Ford filed an “Objection to Plaintiff’s filing a pleading called
‘Order’” requesting the ALJ incorporate by reference all its arguments
previously made in response to the motion to clarify and to strike the new
proposed order. Ford reasoned the
proposed order would have been appropriate in a petition for reconsideration; however,
for reasons previously set forth the order was late and not allowed by rule or
statute. Ford also asserted the ALJ’s
original opinion and order cannot be altered due to Fuertes’ oversight and
failure to timely file a petition for reconsideration and proposed order.
On that same
date, the ALJ entered the order in question amending the August 8, 2016, Order as
follows:
The Plaintiff's
permanent partial disability benefits shall be enhanced by a factor of
"2" per KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 beginning on March 11, 2005, together with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum on all past due and unpaid installments
of such compensation.
In addition, the
ALJ entered an order approving an attorney’s fee for Fuertes’ counsel.
Ford’s
arguments on appeal are as follows:
1. KRS 342.281 sets forth that a Petition for
Reconsideration of an ALJ’s Order must be presented within 14 days of the ALJ’s
decision and Respondent’s attempt to circumvent this rule by naming a Petition
for Reconsideration a ‘Motion to Clarify’ does not create a new time period for
asking for review.
2. The Petitioner was not obligated to pay the 2x
until after the law changed in 2015 in another case (Livingood v.
Transfreight). Thus, no interest can be owed for a period of time when
benefits were not owed. Interest cannot be owed on benefits that were not due.
3. This case is distinct from a normal appeal and one
that, when the Employer loses, back interest and PPD are to be paid. Legally,
no principle became due and owed until, at the earliest, Livingood, which
changed the 2x law that related to Fuertes surprise ‘win’ and remand. Since no
back due principle was due under the Chrysalis law, it follows that no interest
is due when there is no principle due.
We will only
address Ford’s first argument since it is the only issue subject to our
review.
Ford argues
KRS 342.281 and 803 KAR 25 do not set forth legal provisions for this “newly
coined motion.” Thus, it should be
stricken as an improper method to review the August 8, 2016, Order which became
final on September 10, 2016. Ford correctly
notes KRS 342.281, KRS 342.285, and 803 KAR 25 et. seq. permit the filing of a
petition for reconsideration to allow the ALJ to correct patent errors such as
omissions contained within the award, calculation errors, or patent error not
based on legal interpretation.
Therefore, Ford argues Fuertes should have filed a petition for
reconsideration on or about August 24, 2016.
Since neither party filed a petition for reconsideration, the award
became final on September 10, 2016. Ford
argues the motion to clarify is nothing more than a late petition for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fuertes
should not have been permitted to utilize new forms of relief in an effort to
disguise an untimely petition for reconsideration. Ford requests the untimely December 22, 2016,
Order be vacated.
The ALJ did
not have jurisdiction and thereby the authority to enter the December 22, 2016,
Order. Upon entry of the August 8, 2016,
Order, neither party filed a petition for reconsideration nor a timely notice
of appeal. Thus, the ALJ’s order became
final and no longer appealable thirty days after its rendition. Notably, the
claim had not been reopened when Ford filed multiple medical fee disputes
because it failed to file a motion to reopen as required by 803 KAR 25:012
Section 1(6) which reads as follows:
(6) Following resolution of a workers' compensation claim by
final order, a motion to reopen pursuant to 803 KAR
25:010, Section 4(6), shall be filed in addition to the Form 112.
(a) Unless utilization review has been initiated, the motion to
reopen and Form 112 shall be filed within thirty (30) days following receipt of
a complete statement for services pursuant to 803 KAR
25:096.
(b) The motion to reopen and Form 112 shall be served on the
parties, upon the employee, even if represented by counsel, and upon the
medical providers whose services or charges are at issue. If appropriate, the
pleadings shall also be accompanied by a motion to join the medical provider as
a party.
(c) This dispute shall be assigned to the Frankfort motion
docket, where it shall be either summarily decided upon the pleadings, or
assigned to an administrative law judge for further proof time and final
resolution.
ALJ Kerr’s June 24, 2011, Opinion and
Award which incorporated by reference his decision of October 21, 2010, is a
final order. Thus, in order for Ford to
assert a medical fee dispute it was required to file a motion to reopen. Since a motion to reopen was not filed and there
was no appeal from the August 8, 2016, Order, the ALJ did not have jurisdiction
to enter his December 22, 2016, Order.
We emphasize that even though the ALJ did not have jurisdiction to enter
the December 22, 2016, Order, this does not negate Ford’s right to appeal from
that order.
In Tube Turns Div. v. Logsdon,
677 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Ky. 1984), the Court of Appeals defined a final order as
follows:
A final order has been defined as one that “either terminates the
action itself, decides some matter litigated by the parties or operates to
divest some right, in such a manner as to put it out of the power of the court
making the order after the expiration of the term to place the parties in their
original condition.” North American
Refractories v. Day, 284 Ky. 458, 145 S.W.2d 75 (1940). This
definition has been applied to Workers' Compensation cases, cf. Searcy v.
Three Point Coal Co., 280 Ky. 683, 134 S.W.2d 228 (1939); Green River
Fuel Co. v. Sutton, 260 Ky. 288, 84 S.W.2d 79 (1935).
The ALJ’s August 8, 2016, Order clearly
constituted a final order. If either
party desired an amendment to the order, the timely filing of a petition for
reconsideration was necessary. Since
neither party filed a petition for reconsideration seeking relief from that
order, the ALJ’s August 2016 order became final on or about September 8, 2016,
thereby divesting the ALJ of jurisdiction of the claim. Therefore, the ALJ did not have jurisdiction
to consider Fuertes’ November 9, 2016, Motion to Clarify Ruling.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Davis
v. Warrior Coal, LLC, 2009-SC-000773-WC, rendered August 26, 2010,
Designated Not To Be Published, is dispositive.
In Davis, the ALJ denied Davis’ post-award motion for additional
interest pursuant to KRS 342.040(1) and for sanctions against Warrior Coal
pursuant to KRS 342.310(1). Davis
appealed to this Board asserting the ALJ erred in refusing to award additional
interest and impose sanctions. Davis
complained Warrior Coal failed to comply with KRS 342.040(1) when it failed to reinstate
voluntary benefits after the BRC. Davis
argued he was entitled to the same weekly benefit for 520 weeks regardless of
whether the ALJ found him partially or totally disabled. Davis also complained Warrior Coal failed to
begin payment of the award in a timely manner.
The denial of the motion for additional interest and sanctions was
affirmed by this Board and the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed stating as
follows:
The claimant's argument
might have been persuasive had he raised it in the initial proceeding, but he
did not. The ALJ chose not to sanction the employer sua sponte under KRS 342.310(1)
for defending the claim for the initial 520 weeks of benefits without
reasonable ground. Moreover, the claimant failed to petition for
reconsideration and request findings of fact with respect to additional
interest or sanctions based on the employer's failure to resume paying
voluntary TTD benefits after the BRC.
The claimant asserted
his entitlement to additional interest for the first time in a motion filed
after his award became final. He would not have been entitled to prevail even
if the ALJ viewed his post-award motion as raising a new claim1
based on the June 21, 2004 injury because KRS 342.270(1)
states in pertinent part as follows:
. . .
II. Post-Award Delay in Paying Benefits
The claimant
complains that the employer failed to comply with his July 28, 2008 award by
paying past-due benefits immediately and beginning to pay future benefits
immediately. Moreover, the employer had yet to pay anything when he filed his
motion on September 8, 2008. He argues that the employer's failure to do so was
without reasonable foundation and warranted the imposition of 18% interest from
July 28, 2008 under KRS 342.040(1)
as well as sanctions under KRS 342.310(1)
and 803 KAR
25:010, § 24. He concludes, therefore, that the ALJ erred by denying
his motion. We disagree.
The ALJ lacked
jurisdiction to resolve this portion of the parties' dispute and did not err by
denying the motion summarily. The claimant filed the motion after his award
became final. He did not seek to reopen the award or allege a ground for doing
so. This portion of the motion sought to penalize the employer for a delay in
complying with the terms of the award and prompt the employer to comply. KRS 342.305
views a final workers' compensation award as being the equivalent of a judgment
and designates circuit court as the proper forum for seeking enforcement.
Slip
Op. at 2-3.
As in Davis, since the August
8, 2016, Order was final and no longer appealable and a motion to reopen had
not been filed, the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to resolve Fuertes’ Motion to Clarify
Ruling and erred in entering the December 22, 2016, Order. Thus, the ALJ’s December 22, 2016, Order must
be vacated. We cannot address Ford’s
second and third allegations of error as those issues are not properly before
us. This Board is only vested with
jurisdiction to address the propriety of the ALJ’s December 22, 2016, Order.
Accordingly, the December 22, 2016,
Order amending the ALJ’s August 8, 2016, Order is VACATED. We are not
remanding the claim to the ALJ since the posture of this record demonstrates
the ALJ currently has no jurisdiction or authority to issue an order relating in
this claim.
ALL CONCUR.
COUNSEL
FOR PETITIONER:
HON ELIZABETH
HAHN
401 S FOURTH ST
STE 2200
LOUISVILLE KY 40202
COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENT:
HON CHED JENNINGS
401 W MAIN ST STE 1910
LOUISVILLE KY 40202
RESPONDENT:
JOHN J FUERTES 5715 MOSER
FARM RD |
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE:
HON JONATHAN WEATHERBY
657 CHAMBERLIN AVE
FRANKFORT KY 40601
[1] The August 2016 Order contains a handwritten
notation of “8-10-16” directly out from the ALJ’s signature. However, the Litigation
Management System (“LMS”) reflects the Order was entered on August 8, 2016.
Thus, we will accept the order as being rendered on August 8, 2016.
[2] Ford filed two medical disputes in September
2014, one in October 2014, and two in February 2015.
[3] Neither the paper file nor LMS contain
Ford’s purported filing referenced in Fuertes’ response.