Workers’
Compensation Board
OPINION
ENTERED: April 4, 2014
CLAIM NO. 201300296
WENDY HANAWALT PETITIONER
VS. APPEAL FROM HON. OTTO
DANIEL WOLFF, IV,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
J. THOMAS BROWN AND KAREN BROWN
D/B/A WILD ROSE EQUESTRIAN CENTER;
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND;
and HON. OTTO DANIEL WOLFF, IV,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RESPONDENTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*
* * * * *
BEFORE: ALVEY, Chairman, STIVERS and RECHTER, Members.
ALVEY,
Chairman. Wendy
Hanawalt (“Hanawalt”) seeks review of the opinion and order rendered November
18, 2013 by Hon. Otto Daniel Wolff, IV, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
dismissing her claim pursuant to the agricultural exemption contained in KRS
342.650(5). Hanawalt also seeks review
of the December 18, 2013 order overruling her petition for
reconsideration. The claim was
bifurcated at the July 9, 2013 benefit review conference to determine the
applicability of the agricultural exemption.
On appeal, Hanawalt
argues the ALJ erred in finding her employer, J. Thomas Brown and Karen Brown,
D/B/A Wild Rose Equestrian Center (“the Center”), qualified for the
agricultural exemption pursuant to KRS 342.0011(18), KRS 342.630(1) and KRS
342.650(5). Hanawalt likewise argues the
ALJ erred in finding she was employed in agriculture and therefore exempt from
coverage pursuant to KRS 342.650(5).
Hanawalt filed a Form
101 alleging she injured her head and neck on July 18, 2011, when she fell off
a horse and struck a tree while employed as a “barn manager.” In the attached Form 104, Hanawalt describes
the Center as a horse farm for which she worked as a barn manager from June
2002 through June 2005 and again from June 2006 through June 2012. Because the Center did not have workers’
compensation coverage on the date of injury, the Uninsured Employers’ Fund was
also named as a defendant.
Hanawalt testified by
deposition on September 19, 2013 and at the hearing held October 1, 2013. Hanawalt was born on August 15, 1973 and
resides in Cecilia, Kentucky. She is
skilled in the handling and training of horses, including thoroughbreds, having
worked with them for many years.
Hanawalt began working for the Center in 2001. Although she alleged on the Form 101 her job title was “barn manager”, Hanawalt admitted
she stated her job title was “horse trainer” on her income tax returns.
Regardless of her job
title, Hanawalt was involved in most horse-related activities offered by the
Center, including riding lessons, camps and academies, horse boarding, horse
training, therapeutic riding, hippotherapy, and special events. Hanawalt testified riding lessons were
offered to the general public which was the predominant activity of the
Center. Hanawalt instructed riders and assisted
in catching, tacking and grooming the horses.
The horses were either provided by the Center or brought by an individual
seeking lessons. Hanawalt sometimes
helped with the camps and academies offered on-site by the Center which taught
students how to ride and care for horses.
She ensured the horses were ready, occasionally provided instruction,
monitored the students in grooming and tacking, and helped catch horses.
The Center also boarded
and trained its own horses used for riding lessons, academies and camps, and
charged a fee for horses owned by outside individuals. The Center boarded any breed of horse,
including thoroughbreds. Hanawalt
cleaned stalls, fed horses, administered medication, supervised others, ensured
there was enough hay in the field, monitored horses for sores and other medical
problems, trimmed horses’ feet and checked the fence line. She also readied horses for shows,
therapeutic riding and hippotherapy.
Hanawalt testified she
also helped train all types of horses, including thoroughbreds, on site at the
Center. Hanawalt indicated she typically
rode four to five horses she was training on a daily basis. The time she spent riding and training a
horse varied depending on its age and level of training.
Hanawalt stated on a
typical day at the Center, she performed certain activities, and then would check
with Karen Brown (“Brown”), the owner of the Center, to see what was needed for
her to do that particular day. The
Center usually had over one hundred horses on the premises. The time it took her to groom, tack and ready
a horse varied.
On July 18, 2011,
Hanawalt was injured when she fell off a thoroughbred horse she was training
for racing, stating as follows:
Q: And at the time this event happened that was
reported that is the basis of this claim, your[sic] coming off the horse and so
forth, you were riding a thoroughbred at that time, you had been working with
it to do the basic things of, I don’t know what to call it, you’ll have a
better term than I would, basic breaking of the horse where nobody had ridden
it, getting it used to you or somebody being able to climb on it to ride it
some?
A: Yes.
Q: And the folks that owned that horse had brought
it there to get that service done, be part of that farm operation, they were
standing out in the field with Karen watching and you were having to go around
and show how far you all had come along with the horse at that point?
A: Yes.
.
. . .
Q: Ma’am, the horse you were training at the
time of the injury was a thoroughbred?
A: Yes.
Q: And that was one you had trained?
A: I had trained it.
Q: And that was trained for people that were
going to race that horse subsequently, is that your understanding?
A: Yes.
Karen Brown (“Karen”)
also testified by deposition on June 12, 2013.
She and her husband own the Center, which has been in operation for
approximately twelve years. The Center
and the Browns’ residential home sit on a two hundred acre farm. Approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
the farm consists of a wooded area for trails, training, and riding, with the
remainder of the land equally divided between pastures and hayfields. The Center predominantly gives riding lessons
but also trains horses, teaches students horsemanship and offers various
camps. Karen stated the Center trained
mostly “court horses, Arabians, Appaloosas, thoroughbreds and warmbloods,
three-gaited horses basically.” The
Center owns a wide variety of horses as well, “everything from miniatures to
Belgians,” for the activities it offers.
The Center also boards horses.
Karen testified she did
not carry workers’ compensation insurance because she had understood her
business was agriculturally exempt from coverage. She considered Hanawalt’s work activities at
the time she was injured part of her agricultural business. Karen confirmed the local property value
assessment office lists the majority of the Center’s property value as an
agricultural business. Subsequent to
Hanawalt’s work accident, an investigator from the Kentucky Department of
Workers’ Claims visited the Center and told her it was exempt from
coverage.
Karen testified
Hanawalt worked for the Center on and off for seven to eight years, typically
Monday through Friday, forty hours per week.
Hanawalt was paid hourly and was issued W-2s. Hanawalt did not have an official job title,
but was a horse trainer and took care of all the horses. She also performed daily farming duties such
as “feeding, turnout, cleaning water buckets, aisleways, maintenance of fence
lines, check fences, checking horses in her care.” She also medicated horses, and cleaned the
barns and horses. She assisted in camps,
teaching students how to ride horses.
Karen witnessed the
July 18, 2011 accident, stating Hanawalt fell off a thoroughbred horse while
she was demonstrating its progress of movement.
Hanawalt had been in charge of training this particular thoroughbred
horse. The owners of the thoroughbred
horse from which Hanawalt fell consisted of a group of individuals, called the
Livingston Group, and it was being trained to eventually race. The thoroughbred horse “was going to the
training track after he left us. We
don’t do any of the racing. We do basic
starting.”
The Center had previously
trained at least four thoroughbreds for the Livingston Group, the majority of
which Hanawalt was involved in since she had “quite a bit of experience with
thoroughbreds and with the track.” Karen
testified the Center “started” numerous horses, racing and non-racing, and
Hanawalt “has trained many, many, many horses in her time frame there.” Once the Center completed this initial
training, the owners continued a horse’s training at other facilities of their
choosing. Brown reiterated Hanawalt was
injured when she fell off a thoroughbred horse she was training.
On cross-examination, Karen
agreed at the time of work injury, the majority of the Center’s income was
derived from riding lessons, academies and camps. The Center derived “very minimal” income from
special events, such as birthday parties, weddings, therapeutic riding sessions,
and hippotherapy.
Karen stated at the
time of Hanawalt’s injury, she was training only one thoroughbred horse to
eventually race. Karen replied “no” when
asked if there were “any other horses besides thoroughbreds that you were
training for the racetrack?” The Center
also “constantly” trained its own horses used for the riding lessons, academies
and camps, as well as other breeds of horses owned by outside clients. However, the majority of training involved
“outside horses” since the Center’s horses “were predominantly where they
needed to be.” Karen stated “it was
[Hanawalt’s] job to train all outside horses.
When she did not have outside horses, she would work on the academy
horses and the lesson horses.”
In the year preceding
her injury, Karen stated Hanawalt “did not do a lot with lesson horses,” and
trained the one thoroughbred horse she was injured on. The majority of Hanawalt’s training dealt
with horses brought in by outside owners.
A: When they come in for training, they go
straight to Wendy. She works with those
horses. That was her venue.
Q: Okay.
A: She would take those horses in. We may have horses with disciplinary issues,
nasty horses, bad habits. They kick,
they bite. She would work with those
horses.
Q: It didn’t matter what breed it was?
A: Exactly.
It doesn’t matter what breed it is.
She would work with those horses and modify behavioral issues and educate
them into their job description and move them on to where they were socially
acceptable for their field of work.
.
. . .
Q: And that’s my question. Any other breeds - - it doesn’t matter if
it’s a paint, walking horse - - anything other than thoroughbreds - - would
consist of the majority that she trained one year prior; is that correct?
A: Most of - - were other breeds, yes.
Based upon the
testimony of Hanawalt and Karen, the ALJ determined the Claimant was employed
in agriculture at the time of her work injury, and thus, under KRS 342.650(5)
exempt from coverage under the Act by stating as follows:
At her October 1, 2013 final
Hearing, Plaintiff testified Wild Rose was a farm that was totally committed to
the horses. Plaintiff’s basic work was
maintaining and training the horses. She
mucked stalls, fetched hay for the horses, broke the horses, groomed the
horses, trained the horses, maintained fence lines, and performed other work
tasks needed in the daily operation of a horse farm.
Wild Rose offered camps and
group lessons for teaching people how to ride a horse. These lessons could be conducted outside or
in an on-site covered facility. Her
participation in the camp was based upon whether Karen Brown needed her help
teaching the students.
Wild Rose also boarded
horses. Several of the horses were
thoroughbreds, and Plaintiff participated in maintaining and training the
boarded horses, including the thoroughbreds.
Plaintiff indicated she worked
at Wild Rose because of her knowledge and ability to handle and train
horses. Defendant usually had over 100
horses on-site. The majority of
Plaintiff’s work time was working with the horses rather than interacting with
students or owners.
Plaintiff described a typical
work-day. Upon arrival, she would go to
the barn and make sure it was clean, and, then check to see if there were notes
indicating a fence was down. She
testified, “I would check in with Karen to see what she needed me to do that
day.” During a typical day she did
fencing, feeding, trimmed horses’ feet, trained, etc.
For her work, Plaintiff was paid
by check twice a month. The amount she received was based upon how many hours
she worked. In Defendant’s discovery
deposition and final Hearing, Plaintiff was asked about entries on her income
tax returns. On her tax returns she indicated her occupation as “horse
trainer.”
Karen Brown (“Karen”) was
deposed on June 12, 2013, and this constituted her only input in this
claim. It was her opinion Plaintiff was
an employee of Wild Rose. Karen
described Wild Rose as a farm with hayfields, pastures, and horse boarding and
riding facilities. The crops raised on
the farm were used and consumed at Wild Rose.
Karen described Plaintiff’s
daily work as, “she trained horses in many other activities needed on a farm or
daily running of the farm and the duties included as a trainer.” The horse from which Plaintiff fell, was
being trained and boarded at the farm. The
goal of the horse’s owner was to prepare the horse for further training as a
race horse. Wild Rose did not train
horses to race.
Though other witnesses
participated in this litigation, and numerous pieces of documentation filed,
there is little value to this input regarding the issue at hand. The input of Danny Hutcherson, Hardin County
Property Valuation Administrator, the input regarding the interaction between
Karen and Mr. Kevin Booker, Enforcement Officer, Kentucky Labor Cabinet,
Department of Workers’ Claims, offers little, if anything, in determining
whether Plaintiff’s work activities of feeding, maintaining horse stalls, and
caring for the boarded horses are work activities ordinarily and customarily
conducted on farm premises and/or activities generally recognized as
constituting an agricultural pursuit. As
set forth in Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc.,582 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Ky.
1978) and Jaime Lopez-Tinoco v. Bush Sod Farms, Claim No. 2009-00835,
Board Opinion, August 8, 2011, this is the context of the question whether
Plaintiff is exempt from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act pursuant
to KRS 342.650 (5).
In the case sub judice one need
not look far to find the answer to this question. In Fitzpatrick, supra, the
Supreme Court determined feeding horses, housing horses, and caring for horses
are activities ordinarily and customarily conducted on farm premises, and are
activities generally recognized as an agricultural pursuit.
Plaintiff testified her work
activities at Wild Rose involved working with the boarding of horses, training
horses, breaking horses, feeding horses, grooming horses, returning horses to
pasture, mucking horse stalls, supplying hay to the horses out in the field,
checking and mending fences, trimming the horses’ feet, supervising the
treatment of the horses’ medical problems, etc.
Wild Rose’s co-owner and
co-operator, Karen Brown testified Plaintiff trained horses, fed the horses,
turned-out the horses, cleaned the water buckets and aisleways of the stalls,
checked and maintained the fence lines, mucked the stalls, medicated the horses
when necessary, trained the horses, and performed other work tasks needed in
the daily operation of a farm premises.
Based upon Plaintiff’s
testimony, the testimony of Karen Brown, the statutory law as set forth in KRS
342.650 (5), and Kentucky case law, including Fitzpatrick, supra
and Jamie Lopez-Tinoco, supra, it is determined Plaintiff was, at
the time of her work injury, employed in agriculture and thus, under KRS
342.650 (5) exempt from the coverage provided under the Kentucky Workers’
Compensation Act. Based upon this
determination, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.
Hanawalt filed a
petition for reconsideration, asserting the same arguments she now makes on
appeal. In an order dated December 18,
2013, the ALJ overruled Hanawalt’s petition, stating it impermissibly sought to
have the facts reconsidered and re-weighed.
On appeal, Hanawalt
argues the Center does not qualify for the agricultural exemption under KRS
342.0011(18), KRS 342.630(1) and KRS 342.650(5). Hanawalt argues the ALJ erred in finding the
Center’s main operation qualifies as “agriculture” as defined in KRS
342.0011(18). She argues providing
riding lessons, training and facilities is not the “raising of livestock for
food products and for racing purposes.” See KRS 342.0011(18). She also argues because the operation of an
equestrian center is not included in the definition of agriculture pursuant to
KRS 342.0011(18), the Center is not exempt from the Act. She also points out the majority of the
Center’s income derived from riding lessons and horse training, activities of
which do not amount to a farming pursuit and therefore does not qualify for the
agricultural exemption.
Likewise, Hanawalt
argues she was not employed in agricultural pursuant to KRS 342.650(5). She first noted the majority of her job
entailed the caring for horses which “were used for riding lessons or trained
to be race horses.” Hanawalt argues
since the work she performed was for a non-exempt service, she must be covered
under the Act. Therefore, the ALJ erred in
finding her exempt from coverage since she provided horse care for services
rendered by the Center, and not pursuant to the raising of any livestock for
food product or for racing purposes. In
fact, at the time of her injury, she was riding a thoroughbred horse being
trained at the farm for private clients.
We begin by reviewing
the statutory authority concerning the agricultural exemption. KRS 342.630(1) states “any person, other than
one engaged solely in agriculture” that has one or more employees are employers
mandatorily subject to and required to comply with the Workers’ Compensation
Act. KRS 342.650 provides classes of
employees who are exempt from coverage under the Act and includes “Any person
employed in agriculture.” KRS
342.650(5). KRS 342.0011(18) defines
agriculture as follows:
‘Agriculture’ means the operation of farm premises, including the
planting, cultivation, producing, growing, harvesting, and preparation for
market of agricultural or horticultural commodities thereon, the raising of
livestock for food products and for
racing purposes, and poultry thereon, and any work performed as an incident
to or in conjunction with the farm operations, including the sale of produce at
on-site markets and the processing of produce for sale at on-site markets.
(Emphasis added)
Upon review of applicable case law and the statutory
authority set forth in KRS Chapter 342, we conclude that in order for the
exclusion contained in KRS 342.650(5) to apply, evidence must demonstrate the
whole character of the employee/employer’s work is agricultural/ farming in
nature. As indicated by the case law set
forth herein, simply engaging in incidental services which may be typically
farming/agricultural in nature is insufficient to trigger the exclusion contained
in KRS 342.650(5) where the incidental farming/agricultural work is essential
to and in furtherance of another business purpose.
Admittedly the cases dealing with what constitutes
agricultural work are sparse, particularly when looking at horse farms or equestrian centers.
In Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm,
Inc., 582 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. App. 1978), the Kentucky
Court of Appeals addressed whether the operator of a farm who boarded
thoroughbred race horses was excluded from the operation of the Act in view of
the definition of agriculture. The
evidence established the petitioner operated a farm premises in which tobacco,
hay, cattle and thoroughbred yearlings were raised. In addition, thoroughbred brood mares owned
by other people were fed, housed and cared for on the farm. Financial reports indicated over a three year
period, seventy-three percent of the farm’s gross receipts came from the
boarding of brood mares owned by others.
Id. at 45.
The Court
first noted it could not find in its research any Court holding the usual
practice of animal husbandry is not included within the general term
“agriculture.” The Court also noted
animal husbandry is defined by Webster’s
Dictionary as a branch of agricultural concerned with
the production and care of domestic animals.
Id. at 46. The Court
rejected the argument since the boarding of mares is not specifically mentioned
in the legislative definition of agriculture, the activity should be excluded,
by stating as follows:
The
legislative definition of agricultural is stated in general terms as meaning
‘the operation of farm premises’ and the following enumeration of more specific
types of activity to be included within the general term does not have the
effect of excluding all that is not mentioned.
Particularly this is true when in the same definition the legislature
went on specifically to enumerate those activities which were not to be
included within the general term. Id.
The Court ultimately held “animal husbandry is an agricultural pursuit
and that feeding, housing, and caring for horses is
an activity customarily conducted on farm premises and an activity generally
recognized as an agricultural pursuit.” Id. The Court’s holding was not altered by the
fact the farm fed, housed and cared for horses belonging to someone else for a
fee, perhaps giving the operation a commercial rather than agricultural
connotation, stating as follows:
However, the ‘hortel’ has not
been generally recognized as being a separate and distinct commercial enterprise.
While some people may make reference to the race horse ‘industry’, the
definition of agriculture set out in the statute specifically includes the
raising of livestock for racing purposes. The ‘raising’ of race horses
obviously includes feeding, housing, and caring for brood mares. It would be an
illogical and impermissibly narrow distinction to say that raising race horses
is agriculture, but that once they are ‘raised’, (presumably from foal to
racing age) their feeding, housing, and care rendered on farm premises becomes
a commercial operation.
Neither can this Court find any logical basis for making a distinction based on
the ownership of the horses involved. The activity of feeding, housing, and
caring for the horses is exactly the same whether the horse is owned by the
operator of the farm premises or someone else. The normal routine of farm
operation is not changed simply because the farm operator cares for brood mares
owned by others in addition to caring for his own brood mares. Id. at 47.
In Michael v. Cobos, 744 S.W.2d
419 (Ky. 1987), the Kentucky Supreme Court held the agriculture exemption
includes the conditioning and exercising of racehorses which have been released
to the track, but have returned to the farm for rehabilitation from an
injury. The claimant was injured when he
fell from a horse he was exercising which had been returned to the farm after
an injury. He was employed as an
exerciser at the farm and was required to ride the thoroughbreds, clean tack
room materials, shake stalls and clean the barns. Id. at 420. After quoting the legislative definition of
agriculture, which includes the raising of livestock for racing purposes, the
Court stated the horses raised on this particular farm were for racing purposes
and the claimant was injured falling from one.
This conclusion is not altered by the fact the horse from which the claimant
fell had already left the farm to race
and was back for rehabilitation from an injury.
Id. After citing to Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, supra,
the Court held as follows:
Thus,
the question to be decided is whether the conditioning and exercising of
racehorses which have been released to the track, but have returned to the farm
for rehabilitation following an injury ‘is an activity ordinarily and
customarily conducted on farm premises and an activity generally recognized as
an agricultural pursuit.’ We hold that
it is . . . .
Id. (citing Fitzpatrick
v. Crestfield Farm, 582 S.W.2d at 46.).
Although
not binding case authority, we find the following unpublished case of Steve
Crabtree v. John Grider, No. 1991-SC-787-WC (rendered June 4, 1992)(not to
be published) provides guidance and is helpful in our analysis. In Crabtree, the claimant was injured
while working as a groomer for Hillview Stables, an animal husbandry enterprise
involved in the breeding, raising, training, boarding and selling of
horses. The claimant injured himself
when he fell off a horse. His job
consisted of cleaning barns and stalls, grooming horses, and assisting with
training. Of the thirty horses kept on
the farm, some were owned by the Employer while others were there for
boarding/training purposes. The majority
of them were primarily show and riding horses.
The owner’s entire income was derived from the operation of the farm and
its activities such as blacksmith services, show winnings, stud fees, judging
fees, and horse sale commissions. The
Court of Appeals held the enterprise did not fit within the agricultural exemption
since the majority of the horses were not race horses.
In
reversing the Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted although KRS
342.0011(18) specifically mentions the raising of livestock for racing
purposes, it does not exclude the raising of livestock for other purposes. The Court found the legislative general
definition “Agriculture means the operation of farm premises” to be
comprehensive. Id., slip opinion
at p. 3. The Court went on to state as
follows:
[W]e
believe that restricting the agricultural exemption to horse farms involving
only race horses places an impermissible limitation upon the application of the
statute. Furthermore, we can discern no
rational basis for treating horse farms for racing purposes and show purposes
differently.
Id., slip opinion at p. 3-4
After reviewing the reasoning by the Court of Appeals in Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, supra, the Court went on to state:
The
obvious impact of specifically naming the raising of livestock for racing
purposes represents a clear legislative intent that such activity be exempted
as agriculture. However, even without
the specification, we believe the general clause would have included farm
premises for the purpose of raising race horses or show horses. Many other jurisdictions exempt farm
laborers, and it has been recognized that ‘[t]he term “agriculture” used in the
Kentucky Act supplies a boundary which is broader, in many instances, than that
employed by other states and certainly equal to the most liberal . . . . [I]t
can be readily seen that the boundary extends further in some cases than in
others, and that “agriculture” is the broadest exclusion.’
Id. slip opinion at p. 4-5 (citing Robinson v. Lytle, 124
S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. 1939)).
With the
above statutory language and case law, we can quickly address Hanawalt’s
argument because the operation of an
equestrian center is not specifically included in the definition of agriculture
pursuant to KRS 342.0011(18), the Center is not exempt from the Act. This argument was specifically rejected by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Fitzpatrick, 582 S.W.2d at 46. The Court found the enumeration of more
specific types of activities following a general term does not automatically
have the effect of excluding all activities which are not mentioned, including
the boarding of mares. Id.
The same is true in the case sub
judice. The fact the general
operation of an equestrian center is specifically mentioned in the definition
as an included activity following the general term “[a]gricultural means the
operation of farm premises,” does not have the effect of automatic exclusion. Therefore, the question before the Board is
whether the feeding, caring and training of horses at an equestrian center
which offers only horse-related services including horse boarding, training,
riding lessons, camps, and academies are activities “customarily conducted on
farm premises and an activity generally recognized as an agricultural
pursuit.” Id.
Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination in the affirmative, in light of the
above referenced statutory and case law, and the largely consistent testimony
of Brown and Hanawalt. The Court of
Appeals in Fitzpatrick specifically held “animal
husbandry is an agricultural pursuit and that feeding, housing,
and caring for horses is an activity customarily conducted on farm premises and
an activity generally recognized as an agricultural pursuit.” Id.
Here, the testimony establishes the Center’s farming enterprise
consisted solely of horse-related activities.
The Center maintains and cares for on average over one hundred horses,
some of which are owned by the Center. The
Center sits on a 200 acre farm, which consists of wooded area trails for
training and riding, pastures, hayfields and riding activities. The Center provides riding lessons but also
trains horses, teaches horsemanship, offers various camps and boards
horses.
All of Hanawalt’s job
duties related to the care of the horses.
Karen testified Hanawalt trained horses of all breeds both owned by the
Center and brought in by others for a fee.
She assisted in camps provided to students teaching them how to ride
horses. She performed daily farming
duties previously enumerated. Likewise,
Hanawalt testified she assisted with riding lessons, camps and academies, and
set forth her specific work duties.
We conclude, based upon
the above testimony and case law, the ALJ did not err in determining the Center
was engaged in agriculture, and Hanawalt was, at the time of her work injury, an
agricultural employee.
This conclusion is not
altered by the fact the Center boarded and trained horses belonging to someone
else for a fee. See Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc., 582 S.W.2d at
47. The above-referenced case law
demonstrates the comprehensive reach of the language “agriculture means the
operation of a farm premises.” KRS 342.0011(18). In
addition, although the statutory definition specifically mentions the raising
of livestock for racing purposes, it does not exclude the raising of livestock
for other purposes, such as the operation of an equestrian center. Here, the activity engaged in by Hanawalt at
the time of the injury clearly falls within the purview of KRS 342.650(5). It is undisputed at the time of Hanawalt’s
injury she was training a thoroughbred horse for racing purposes which clearly
falls within the definition of agriculture in KRS
342.0011(18).
Therefore,
the November 18, 2013 opinion and order
and the December 18, 2013 order overruling Hanawalt’s petition for
reconsideration by Hon. Otto Daniel Wolff, IV, Administrative Law Judge, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
COUNSEL
FOR PETITIONER:
HON LARRY D ASHLOCK
333 WEST VINE ST, STE 1200
LEXINGTON, KY 40507
COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENT:
HON THOMAS E COOPER
215 NORTH MULBERRY STREET
ELIZABETHTOWN, KY 42701
OTHER
RESPONDENT:
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
1024 CAPITAL CENTER DR, STE 200
FRANKFORT, KY 40601
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE:
HON OTTO D WOLFF, IV
8120 DREAM
STREET
FLORENCE, KY
41042